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Striking a Balance Between Human Rights and Peace and Stability:
A Review of the European Court of Human Rights Decision
Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina

O

Introduction

n December 22, 2009, the European Court of Human
Rights issued its judgment in the Case of Sejdić and
Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, finding certain provisions of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in
breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
because they created ethnically discriminatory requirements for
certain elected positions.1 The Court’s willingness to address
ethnic discrimination in a post-conflict constitution, like BiH’s,
broke new ground in Europe’s human rights framework. The
legal significance of the decision is three-fold: 1) it marked
the first time that the Court applied the general prohibition
of discrimination prescribed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 12
to the ECHR; 2) it addressed intricate political considerations
pertaining to peace and stability in deciding whether or not to
uphold the ECHR; and 3) it confronted the sensitive issue of the
ECHR’s compatibility with a Member State’s constitution, an
issue with which it has rarely had to deal.2 The Court held that
finding the respondent state in violation of the ECHR was a sufficient remedy for the petitioners, but the legal significance of
finding a power-sharing provision in a post-conflict constitution
in violation of the ECHR remains.3
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President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
President Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia initial the
Dayton Peace Accords.

the third Member may challenge the decision by declaring it
against his constituent peoples’ best interests.11 Similarly, each
of the constituent peoples is represented by five members in the
House of Peoples.12

BiH has a distinctive political system by which the three
largest ethnic groups are equally represented in the state’s institutions. The Constitution of BiH distinguishes between “constituent peoples” (Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats) and “Others” (members of all other ethnic minorities).4 Under the Constitution, only
members of the constituent peoples are eligible to run for the
Presidency and for the House of Peoples – one of two chambers
in the Parliamentary Assembly.5 As of 2000, BiH was composed
of 48 percent Bosniacs, 37.1 percent Serbs, 14.3 percent Croats,
and 0.6 percent other minorities.6

This system of representation was established in the
Constitution of BiH to ensure that none of the constituent
peoples could dominate the government and override the interests of the other groups. BiH adopted its present Constitution
as an annex to the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), a U.S.brokered peace agreement between the respective presidents of
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed on December 14, 1995.13
The goal of the DPA was to end the three-year-long armed
conflict in BiH between Bosnian Serbs on one side and Bosnian
Muslims (Bosniacs) and Bosnian Croats on the other. The DPA
also aimed to secure peace in BiH and stability in the region
by setting up a representative government structure for BiH
and ensuring implementation of the peace agreement by international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and
NATO.14 As such, the primary purpose of the DPA was to find
an acceptable compromise between the three belligerent parties
in order to end the war, and many believe that the constitutional
provisions, challenged in the Sejdić and Finci case, made peace
in BiH possible.15

The Presidency of BiH is a three member collective composed of one Bosniac, one Serb, and one Croat.7 The three
Members of the Presidency are elected by popular vote for a
four-year term.8 Every eight months, one of the three Members
assumes the chair of the Presidency.9 Chairmanship does not
entail any additional powers or functions, but instead serves to
convey an image of leadership. Decisions are made by consensus
among the three Members of the Presidency.10 However, when a
consensus is not reached, the majority may take a decision and

This article reviews the Sejdić and Finci judgment, focusing on how the Court reconciled the interests of human rights
versus those of peace and stability. This dichotomy continues
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Denying certain categories of people one of
the most fundamental rights is neither sustainable
nor acceptable within European standards.
to be intensely controversial and the outcome of the case was
anything but self-evident. As the recent elections in BiH have
shown, ethnic tensions and mistrust still pervade Bosnian
society. However, while there are legitimate concerns and even
fears that changing the Constitution to include the Others in the
government will only spark tensions, there are ways to integrate
minorities without encroaching on the representation of the
three major ethnic groups. Denying certain categories of people
one of the most fundamental rights is neither sustainable nor
acceptable within European standards. While BiH is currently
under European pressure to reform its constitution, the long term
implications of the Court’s decision for BiH are likely to be far
reaching.

is no “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be reali[z]ed.”23 Because
differences in treatment are not all objectionable, states are
granted a certain margin of appreciation “in assessing whether
and to what extent differences justify a different treatment in
law.”24 The scope of this margin of appreciation varies according
to the subject matter of the discrimination and the circumstances
of a particular case.25
In its defense, BiH argued that the discriminatory provisions
contained in the Constitution were objectively and reasonably
justified. It relied on the case of Zdanoka v. Latvia in which the
Court declared that:
[S]tates enjoy considerable latitude in establishing constitutional rules on the status of members of parliament,
including criteria governing eligibility to stand for
election . . . these criteria vary in accordance with the
historical and political factors specific to each State.26

Bosnia’s Breach of the Prohibition of Discrimination
In 2006, M. Sejdić, a Roma, and M. Finci, of Jewish descent,
filed an application to the Court, contending that the Constitution
of BiH deprives them of their right to run for public office on the
sole basis of their ethnic origins in violation of several articles
of the ECHR. Sejdić and Finci, both prominent Bosnian politicians, were ineligible to run for the Presidency and the House of
Peoples, respectively. The two men challenged the Constitution
under Article 14 of the ECHR, which prohibits discrimination
in the exercise of any right set forth in the ECHR,16 in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, guaranteeing free and fair
legislative elections.17 They also relied on Article 1 of Protocol
No. 12,18 which prescribes a general prohibition of discrimination rather than specific discrimination related to another right
under Article 14.19 While petitioners were not affected by an
individual measure, they were nonetheless considered victims
for purposes of admissibility because they were particularly at
risk of being affected by the provisions in question.20
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Supporting their claim that ethnic discrimination amounts to
racial discrimination that can never be justified, the petitioners
looked to the Court’s extensive jurisprudence on discrimination. Specifically, the petitioners cited the case of Timishev v.
Russia, where an ethnic Chechen was denied registration of his
permanent residence in Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria Republic)
on the basis of his former residence in the Chechen Republic.
The Court found that a difference in treatment based exclusively
on a person’s ethnic origin cannot be objectively justified in a
contemporary democratic society.21 The Court has consistently
applied this long-standing “objective and reasonable” test when
considering claims of Article 14 violations. Under the law of the
Council of Europe, not every difference in treatment amounts to
discrimination.22 A difference in treatment violates Article 14 of
the ECHR only if it has “no objective and reasonable justification,” namely, if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there

According to BiH, the unique historical circumstances in
which its Constitution had been adopted warranted the inclusion
of the contested provisions to maintain the fragile equilibrium

Ethnic Composition Map of BiH.
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of power needed to secure peace among the different ethnicities.27 Because this fragile equilibrium still remains a challenge
today, BiH urged that the provisions continue to be necessary.
Changing the Constitution to integrate the Others into the
Presidency and House of Peoples could only be achieved by
eliminating the ethnic power sharing structures. BiH argued that
such an amendment would be impractical because it was not yet
prepared for a political system governed by majority rule.

the Bosnian government that nothing in the ECHR commanded
BiH to completely change its power-sharing mechanisms. In
fact, the Court shared the belief that the time was not ripe for
BiH to adopt a system reflecting majority rule,40 echoing what
the Venice Commission had recommended in its 2005 opinion.41
However, as long as there are other, non-discriminatory means
to achieve power-sharing, the constitutional provisions cannot be
objectively and reasonably justified, as they are not proportional
to the aim sought.

Nevertheless, the Court concluded that ethnic-based discrimination is a form of racial discrimination,28 which is a
“particularly egregious kind of discrimination.”29 As a result,
the Court strictly applied the “objective and reasonable” test in
considering the petitioners’ claim. It found that the provisions at
stake had been legitimate at the time they were drafted because
they aimed to restore peace in BiH.30 However, the Court
avoided the question of whether the provisions were still legitimate and, instead, focused on the criterion of proportionality.31
To decide the proportionality
prong, the Court first examined BiH’s political progress
and then considered whether
other means exist to achieve
proper power-sharing that do
not discriminate against the
Others.
Photos by Vedran Savić.

Ultimately, the Court endorsed the Venice Commission’s
recommendations for the Presidency and House of Peoples.
For the Presidency, the Venice Commission proposed two possibilities: (1) replace the collective Presidency with a single
president and confer most executive powers to the Council
of Ministers in which all constituent peoples are represented
alongside the Others, and allow all Bosnians, regardless of their
ethnicity, to be eligible for the single Presidency; or (2) maintain
the collective Presidency, but
allow all Bosnians to be eligible and devise a rule under
which no more than one
member of the Presidency
belongs to the same constituent peoples or the Others.42
The Venice Commission did,
however, express a preference
for a single Presidency.43 As
for the House of Peoples, the
Venice Commission proposed
complete abolishment and
retaining only the House of
Representatives, which is the
Jacob Finci.
chamber that performs most of
the legislative work and does
not discriminate against the Others.44 The House of Peoples acts
as a check on the House of Representatives, vetoing any piece
of legislation that is perceived as harmful to a people’s interests.
The Venice Commission’s proposal would transfer the exercise
of the vital interest veto to the House of Representatives, which
would become the sole legislative chamber.

The Court listed several
positive developments in
BiH to substantiate its position that BiH had undergone
significant political progress
since the DPA.32 For instance,
Dervo Sejdić .
it noted that in 2006, BiH
joined NATO’s Partnership
for Peace;33 in 2008, BiH signed and ratified a Stabilization
and Association Agreement with the European Union (EU);34
and in 2009, BiH successfully amended its Constitution for the
first time and was elected as a non-permanent member to the
United Nations Security Council. Finally, the Court noted that
the international administration of BiH (the Office of the High
Representative), which had been set up to oversee the implementation of the DPA, had begun to close.35

The Court decided to strike the balance in favor of human
rights, but did not do so in complete disregard of wider peace
and stability considerations. On the contrary, the Court carefully assessed the situation, taking into account various amicus
curiae briefs,45 and concluded that BiH was ready to move away
from its post-conflict government structure without completely
abolishing it. Specifically, the Court found that other minorities
could be integrated into the government without jeopardizing
the protection of the constituent peoples’ interests, which it recognized as paramount.

Another significant factor in the Court’s reasoning was that
BiH had voluntarily agreed, through membership in the Council
of Europe, to abide by its standards.36 In fact, when BiH joined
the Council of Europe in 2002, it agreed to review its electoral
legislation for compliance with the ECHR within one year.37
Moreover, BiH had undertaken the same promise upon entering
the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU.38 BiH
knew that its Constitution was not in conformity with the ECHR,
and therefore, it had the responsibility to reform it. Following
this analysis of the political and legal situation of BiH, the Court
concluded that the discriminatory provisions were not proportional to the aim sought.

Can Upholding Human Rights be a Threat to
Peace and Stability?
While the majority of the Court readily found BiH in violation of the ECHR, three judges wrote dissenting or partly dissenting opinions in which they criticized the Court for failing to
account for the historical background and extraordinary circumstances of the Constition of BiH.46 On the issue of the House of

Lastly, and most importantly, the findings of the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
showed that alternative means exist for a state to successfully
maintain power-sharing mechanisms without discriminating
against certain categories of people.39 The Court agreed with
5

very system that saved its democratic existence.”52 He further
described the ruling of the Court as a decision that “sows ideals and harvests massacres,”53 asserting that peace, security
and public order for all prevail over the right of two groups of
peoples to stand for election.

Peoples, the judgment was decided 14-3, while the Court ruled
16-1 on the issue of the Presidency.47 According to the dissenting judges, the justifications for the constitutional provisions
on the House of Peoples remained valid because BiH’s ethnic
and political situation had changed little since the signing of the
DPA. Dissenting Judges Mijović and Hajiyev observed that BiH
has not made significant progress and that the government still
remains highly unstable. The judges provided several examples
of signs of instability in BiH, such as the ongoing presence of
military forces and advisories against travelling to BiH. The
judges further emphasized that the failure to prosecute suspected
war criminals, the thousands of missing people, and the segregation of schools underscored the judges’ concern that progress in
BiH was not as extensive as the majority suggested.48 Therefore,
Judges Mijović and Hajiyev argued that although the constitutional provisions at issue were
discriminatory, they remained
reasonable and proportional.
The judges mentioned that it
would be ill-advised, if not inappropriate, to strike down constitutional provisions that may
be unjust from a human rights
perspective, but are, nonetheless, necessary to achieve peace
and stability.49

The debate between the majority and the dissent is a recurring debate, and both opinions enjoy support. For instance, other
international human rights bodies, such as the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination54 and the Human Rights
Committee,55 support the reasoning of the majority. Their position is that BiH has made sufficient progress on the path of
peace and reconciliation to depart from the DPA’s original provisions. In contrast, the “peace by all means” approach advocated
by the dissenting judges is the position currently endorsed by
BiH’s Constitutional Court.56
These diverging opinions may
suggest that national judges
are better suited to assess the
situation of BiH. Given BiH’s
extremely complex history,
marked by religious tensions
and centuries of ethnic strife,
it may be difficult to argue that
foreign jurists can better judge
BiH’s readiness to overcome
ethnic power-sharing.

Judge Bonello, who
dissented . . . opposed
what he perceived as
interference by the Court
with an international peace
treaty, claiming that no
state “should be placed
under a legal or ethical
obligation to sabotage the
very system that saved its
democratic existence.”

The dissenting judges’ main
concern was that the changes in
the electoral system, requested
by the applicants and sanctioned
by the Court, could completely
reconfigure the power balance
in BiH — a balance that many
perceive to be extremely fragile.
However, the dissenting judges
did not consider whether alternate non-discriminatory mechanisms existed. While Judges
Mijović and Hajiyev agreed with
the majority that the constitutional provisions pertaining to
the Presidency breached Article
1 of Protocol 12,50 they did not
find that the provisions concerning the House of Peoples violated the ECHR, partly because
of the nature and purpose of the House of Peoples.51 While the
Presidency is the body that represents the state as a whole, the
House of Peoples is the institution where the vital interests of the
constituent peoples are defended. Therefore, by its very nature,
the House of Peoples should ensure specific representation of
the constituent peoples. The argument follows that a change
in the structure of the House of Peoples or its elimination may
give Bosnians the impression that their interests are no longer
protected, which could turn existing ethnic tensions into ethnic
violence.

Favoring peace and stability over human rights may
imply that the two goals can
sometimes be incompatible.
However, implementing the
changes recommended by the
Venice Commission will not
drastically change BiH’s government structure to the detriment of Bosniacs, Croats, and
Serbs. More significantly, promoting human rights through
the establishment of full equality among all Bosnians is a
step forward towards a country
based on equal citizens. As long
as there is a portion of the population that has inferior rights,
there can be no social peace. BiH needs to reform its institutions in order to reflect the principle of equality and ultimately
national cohesion. Thus, human rights are interrelated with
peace and stability.
Implications for the Government of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
The Court’s judgment is a serious condemnation of BiH’s
Constitution and requires active measures to be taken by
the government to fulfill its obligations under the ECHR.57
Although the Court did not expressly order BiH to change its
Constitution, the ruling implies that BiH must do so because it is
the state’s responsibility to avoid another violation of the ECHR
on the same grounds. Consequently, the execution of this judg-

Judge Bonello, who dissented on both issues, strongly
opposed what he perceived as interference by the Court with
an international peace treaty, claiming that no state “should
be placed under a legal or ethical obligation to sabotage the
6

ment requires BiH to enact amendments to the constitutional
provisions governing the elections to the Presidency and the
House of Peoples. As of this writing, the government of BiH has
yet to take the necessary measures to ensure execution of the
judgment. The government’s inaction is hardly surprising given
that constitutional reform in BiH has always proven a delicate
matter. BiH faces two major constitutional reform issues: the
discriminatory electoral system on the one hand, and wider state
structure reforms on the other. While all political stakeholders
recognize the need to change the discriminatory provisions in
light of the Court’s decision,58 they consistently fail to reach a
consensus on the broader state reforms.59

There are various factors motivating BiH to adhere to the
Court’s judgment. Compliance with the human rights standards
of the Council of Europe is essential not only to ensure that BiH
respects its international obligations, but also as a prerequisite
for EU integration. Furthermore, EU accession is one of the
few common grounds that Bosnian political leaders share. What
remains to be seen is how proactive the Council of Europe will
be in urging BiH to implement the Court’s ruling. While the
Council has issued reports and statements on the situation in
BiH, noting the state’s obligation to enforce the ruling,64 no
coercive measures in the form of fines or suspension of rights in
the Council of Europe have been taken. While this lack of pressure may be frustrating, it would be unrealistic for the Council
to adopt a stricter position, as changing a state’s constitution is
altogether more challenging than striking down an individual
measure. The EU may have more leverage to enforce compliance with the Court’s judgment,
especially since it has identified
BiH as the Balkan state lagging most in the EU integration
process.65

As a result, two viewpoints have emerged. The first is
espoused among the Bosnian Serbs who favor minimal changes
that would only concern the discriminatory provisions. The
second view is that of the other two constituent peoples
who want these changes to be
part of a greater reform package.60 The delay in changing
the discriminatory provisions
has accordingly been caused by
dissensions on the broader constitutional amendment package.
Yet, the president of the Council
of Europe’s Parliamentary
Assembly (PACE) stressed, during an official visit to BiH in
March 2010, that while BiH
needs a wide constitutional
reform, the immediate first
step is to change the provisions
excluding the others from holding political office.61 With the rise to power of Serb nationalist hardliners following the 2010 election,62 the prospect of a
broad constitutional reform seems bleak. Nevertheless, there
is a greater chance that a constitutional reform limited to the
discriminatory electoral rules will be carried out due to political
consensus, the Council of Europe reprimand, and the lure of EU
accession.

Favoring peace and
stability over human rights
may imply that the two
goals can sometimes
be incompatible.

While the Court’s decision
is a positive step, as far as
human rights are concerned, it
does not directly address the
more sensitive and challenging
issue of the ethnic divide within
the BiH government. The Court
was neither asked, nor does it
have the jurisdiction to decide
upon this deeper issue. Yet, it is
widely acknowledged that BiH
needs to overcome these wider divisions in order to have a better
functioning government and a cohesive society. As previously
mentioned, the DPA intended to end a war by providing sufficient ethnic safeguards in the constitution. Thus, the DPA was
never designed to be an efficient instrument of government.66 In
effect, the DPA enabled fifteen years of political deadlock and
unmanageable bureaucratic expenses.
Although BiH is still struggling to recover from the effects
of civil war and Bosnians remain in some parts of the country
profoundly divided and distrustful, the only way to achieve
sustainable peace and stability is by fostering a sense of nationhood.67 The persistence of institutionalized ethnic differentiation
is an obstacle to building a country based on citizens, instead
of peoples. Under the current constitution, BiH cannot avoid
nationalistic divide,68 which is its greatest obstacle to peace
and stability. Accordingly, any reference to ethnicity in the
government should be eliminated, as national unity begins with
internal government unity. To overcome its many institutional
defects, BiH should adopt a piecemeal and progressive approach
as opposed to one that is more comprehensive and immediate.
However, it may be a long time before Serbs, Bosniacs or Croats
agree to be ruled by a unified government, and it is not difficult
to understand why. HRB

Conclusion
The Court’s ruling does not compel BiH to completely disassemble its power-sharing mechanisms because a government
based on purely majority rule is currently unrealistic for BiH. In
its judgment, the Court referred to the Venice Commission’s recommendations, which proposed ways to circumvent the exclusion of the Others while maintaining a balance of power between
the three main ethnic groups. Both of the Venice Commission’s
proposals are reasonable and acceptable for political stakeholders. Therefore, nothing should continue to impede the execution
of the Court’s judgment. As the Council of Europe and other
experts have stated,63 changing the discriminatory provisions
should be BiH’s first priority.
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